Pakistan Bleeds, Riyadh Sleeps: The Hollow Promise Of The Saudi–Pakistan Security Pact

The Saudi–Pakistan Security Pact exposes the imbalance behind claims of Islamic unity, revealing Pakistan’s role as Riyadh’s rented military arm amid shifting Gulf alliances, U.S. retreat, and regional realignments after the Abraham Accords.

In my European Times article published on 28 September 2025, I argued that the newly signed Saudi–Pakistan Security Pact reveals less about Islamic solidarity and more about the political economy of outsourced defence. That argument remains salient as Israel’s invasion of Qatar—and Washington’s tacit complicity in it—expose the hollowness of traditional security guarantees in the Gulf, compelling Riyadh to fall back on Pakistan’s rented military muscle. The pact, concluded in the immediate aftermath of the Qatari invasion, thus emerged as a strategic response to the perceived collapse of America’s once-ironclad security guarantee and as a symptom of the broader erosion of trust in U.S. deterrence. Proclaimed as a “mutual defence understanding” asserting that “an act of aggression against either nation shall be deemed an attack on both,” the agreement outwardly evokes a vision of Islamic fraternity and collective deterrence. Yet beyond this rhetoric of mutual defence stands an unmistakable asymmetry—a structurally unequal arrangement that deepens Pakistan’s rentier-military dependency and reinforces its subordinate role within Riyadh’s architecture of security patronage. The lofty idiom of brotherhood conceals a transactional compact in which Pakistan shoulders the burden of defending Saudi interests while receiving little assurance of reciprocity. Situated within the post-Abraham Accords realignment, the pact reflects the waning credibility of the United States as the region’s ultimate security guarantor, the resurgent assertiveness of Iran, and the emergence of Pakistan as a surrogate security provider in a Gulf order increasingly defined by economic leverage, strategic outsourcing, and rentier militarism. In essence, it signals not the birth of a balanced alliance but the reassertion of old hierarchies—where Saudi wealth purchases protection and Pakistani blood secures it—sustaining the illusion of mutual defence amid a fractured and volatile geopolitical landscape.

The Mirage of Mutuality

In the aftermath of Israel’s invasion of Qatar, the announcement of the Saudi–Pakistan Security Pact appeared to signal a deepening convergence between the two Muslim-majority powers. The agreement’s central clause—“an act of aggression against either nation shall be deemed an attack on both”—ostensibly evokes the North Atlantic Treaty’s collective defence ethos. Yet closer scrutiny reveals that this is a mirage of mutuality, not a mirror of NATO’s Article 5. Saudi Arabia’s strategic comfort lies in outsourcing its hard-power functions, while Pakistan’s fragile economy and quest for Gulf patronage drive it toward strategic subservience disguised as partnership. The resulting structure is profoundly one-sided: Pakistan commits blood; Saudi Arabia commits capital.

The Pakistan–Afghanistan War as a Litmus Test

The ongoing Pakistan–Afghanistan conflict serves as a litmus test for the supposed strength and reciprocity of the Saudi–Pakistan Security Pact. Recent engagements along the Durand Line have laid bare Islamabad’s precarious position, as the state finds itself stretched across multiple fronts—combating the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Baloch separatists, and Islamic State–Khorasan (IS-K), while simultaneously managing an escalating border crisis with Afghanistan and shouldering its Gulf security commitments. Reports by Al Jazeera, Reuters, and The Guardian confirm that Pakistani airstrikes inside Afghan territory have killed both militants and civilians, drawing sharp rebukes from Kabul and concern from humanitarian observers. In turn, Taliban forces have retaliated with heavy cross-border fire, claiming significant Pakistani casualties and exposing the fragility of the ceasefire announced on 15 October 2025. Yet, despite the pact’s solemn declaration that “an act of aggression against either nation shall be deemed an attack on both,” not a single Saudi aircraft, troop deployment, or diplomatic initiative has materialised in Islamabad’s defence. Riyadh’s silence is deafening—neither denouncing Afghan aggression nor extending meaningful political support. The imbalance of risk is unmistakable: Pakistan bears the human and strategic cost of its commitments, while Saudi Arabia, insulated by oil wealth, U.S. patronage, and regional distance, remains securely cocooned in comfort. The Afghan clashes have thus stripped away the rhetoric of fraternity and revealed the stark truth that Pakistan alone carries the burden of security, while the Kingdom’s loyalty remains confined to proclamations on paper.

Strategic Rentierism and the Outsourcing of Security

This imbalance is not an anomaly but a continuation of Saudi Arabia’s rentier-security doctrine. A state cushioned by oil wealth and minimal conscription, Riyadh has long delegated defence to external actors—from American contractors and Western advisers to foreign legions and Pakistani contingents. Pakistan’s military personnel have, for decades, staffed Saudi bases, trained royal guards, and provided counter-terror expertise. Yet these deployments never transformed into strategic parity. They instead entrenched a pattern of “security patronage,” in which economic power purchases loyalty but not alliance reciprocity. From a theoretical standpoint, the pact exemplifies what scholar Stephen David termed “omnibalancing”—the notion that smaller states align not merely against external threats but to balance internal vulnerabilities through external patrons. Pakistan’s leadership seeks Gulf funding to offset domestic fragility, while Saudi Arabia depends on reliable foreign manpower to compensate for its societal aversion to combat. The result is an asymmetric dependence artfully camouflaged as brotherhood.

The American Template: Utility and Disposability

Pakistan’s experience with the United States illustrates a similar trajectory of instrumental engagement and abrupt abandonment. During the Cold War, Washington relied on Islamabad as a bulwark against Soviet expansion. During the Afghan jihad of the 1980s and the post-9/11 “War on Terror,” Pakistan served as a logistical artery and intelligence node. Yet each episode concluded with U.S. disillusionment and sanctions once utility waned. The Saudi–Pakistan pact mirrors this dynamic: use when convenient, discard when expendable. Islamabad’s strategic culture, shaped by a chronic search for patrons, leaves it vulnerable to repetitive cycles of transactional exploitation. The current Afghan confrontation merely re-exposes that vulnerability on a new front—this time under the flag of Islamic fraternity rather than Western partnership.

Shifts in the Gulf’s Security Geometry

In the wider landscape of Middle Eastern geopolitics, the Saudi–Pakistan Security Pact must be understood as an instrument born out of the shifting geometry of power in the post-Abraham Accords era. The gradual retrenchment of the United States from the Gulf has compelled regional monarchies to diversify their security portfolios—hedging their bets by courting multiple partners while still keeping one hand firmly under the American strategic umbrella. At the same time, Iran’s growing assertiveness across the Red Sea, Iraq, and Yemen has heightened Riyadh’s sense of vulnerability, pushing it to seek deterrence without engaging in open confrontation. The tentative yet unmistakable rapprochement between Israel and Saudi Arabia further complicates this picture: for Riyadh, overt collaboration with a nuclear-armed Sunni state like Pakistan provides ideological legitimacy in the Islamic world, even as it preserves a careful strategic distance from Israel’s defence bloc. Within this intricate calculus, Pakistan becomes the perfect instrument of convenience—a state that can supply a disciplined Sunni army with plausible deniability, allowing the Kingdom to project power without paying the political or human cost of war. In essence, the Saudi–Pakistan pact is not a defence treaty but an insurance policy, a hedge against uncertainty purchased in Pakistani blood and Saudi riyals, reflecting the transactional underbelly of an alliance built more on necessity than on trust.

The India Factor: Evolving Contours of South Asian Security

The implications of the Saudi–Pakistan Security Pact for India must be understood in the broader context of South Asia’s changing security architecture. While Pakistan imagines such agreements as potential leverage, the strategic reality is otherwise. India’s ascent as a comprehensive security actor—combining economic resilience, maritime reach, technological capability, and strategic partnerships—has altered the regional equilibrium. New Delhi’s cooperation with Saudi Arabia has deepened across counter-terrorism, energy, and investment domains; bilateral trade has surpassed USD 50 billion, and the India–Saudi Strategic Partnership Council now anchors long-term defence and intelligence coordination. India’s expanding presence in the Indian Ocean and West Asia, from the Chabahar Port initiative to naval exercises with Oman and the UAE, further reinforces its profile as a security provider rather than a security seeker.

In this framework, the Saudi–Pakistan Pact appears neither threatening nor transformative for India; it is a stopgap alliance rooted in mutual insecurity rather than shared strength. The reorientation of South Asia’s strategic landscape now pivots around India’s growing partnerships with Gulf States, Iran, and Central Asia, supported by its Quad engagements and maritime diplomacy. Pakistan, conversely, remains confined to transactional militarism. The pact therefore marks not India’s marginalisation but the affirmation of India’s centrality in regional security—a state capable of shaping norms through diplomacy, deterrence, and development. As South Asia evolves from the binaries of Cold War alignment to multi-vector strategic engagement, India’s role is no longer reactive but defining. New Delhi’s calibrated equilibrium between Riyadh, Tehran, and Washington underscores a mature strategic culture: one that seeks stability, not subservience.

Conclusion

In theory, the Saudi–Pakistan Security Pact promised collective security. In practice, it has produced collective illusion. The Pakistan–Afghanistan war has already served as its litmus test—and the treaty failed spectacularly. Saudi Arabia’s non-response to Islamabad’s border conflict reveals that mutual defence exists only in the letter, not in spirit or strategy. Ultimately, the pact exemplifies rentier militarism: Saudi Arabia purchases security; Pakistan sells it. Neither side achieves genuine alliance equilibrium. The Kingdom retains its comfort, and Pakistan its dependency. Just as the United States once used and discarded Pakistan in pursuit of shifting geopolitical goals, Riyadh now practises a subtler version of the same logic—strategic outsourcing under the banner of fraternity. The Afghan front has merely stripped away the pretence. In a region where alliances are bought, not built, the Saudi–Pakistan pact stands as a parable of modern geopolitics: in the politics of patronage, the hired sword always bleeds alone.

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References

1. European Times. “The Pakistan–Saudi Defence Pact Does Not Threaten India.” September 2025.
2. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. India–Afghanistan Joint Statement. October 10, 2025.
3. Times of India. “India Elevates Ties with Taliban, Both Slam Terrorism from Regional Countries.” October 10, 2025.
4. Ferdaus, Abdul Khaliq. Telephonic interview with the author, October 2025.
5. Hindustan Times. “Afghanistan Looks at India as a Close Friend, Says Muttaqi.” October 10, 2025.
6. Zaland, Faiz Mohammad. Online correspondence with the author, October 2025.
7. Economic Times. “Afghanistan Looks at India as a Close Friend.” October 10, 2025.
8. The Hindu. “Afghan Foreign Minister Muttaqi to Visit Deoband, Taj Mahal from October 11–12.” October 11, 2025.
9. The Hindu. “Taliban Will Not Allow Terrorists to Use Afghan Territory, Says Muttaqi.” October 10, 2025.
10. Arab News. “Afghanistan’s Taliban Government Accuses Pakistan of Air Attacks.” October 10, 2025.
11. Zekerya, Emran. Telephonic interview with the author, October 2025.
12. Masomi, Masom Jan. Telephonic discussion with the author, October 2025.
13. “Pakistan, Afghanistan Agree to Temporary Truce after Fresh Fighting.” October 15, 2025.
14. The Guardian. “Dozens Killed in Fresh Clashes along Afghanistan–Pakistan Border.” October 15, 2025.
15. Al Jazeera. “Afghan Taliban and Pakistan Agree Short Truce after Deadly Clashes.” October 15, 2025.
16. Associated Press. “Afghanistan Says It Has Killed 58 Pakistani Soldiers in Overnight Border Operations.” October 15, 2025.
17. Al Jazeera. “Pakistan Reports New Clash with Afghan Forces along Border.” October 14, 2025.
18. Al Jazeera. “No to Trump: Why Afghanistan’s Neighbours Opposed the U.S. Bagram Plan.” October 9, 2025.

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Dr Maheep is a leading analyst of India’s foreign policy and an expert in International Relations and Global Politics. He was recently honoured by the Government of Iran as a distinguished scholar in recognition of his significant intellectual endeavours toward the grand ideal of the New Islamic Civilization. He contributes regularly on issues pertaining to national and global affairs.